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Abstract
The stylized fact that public announcements in financial markets are followed by intense trading,
high trading volume and volatile prices, is widely perceived as the sign of increasing disagreement
due to the announcement. However, it is common to argue that this would be inconsistent with
Bayesian-learning and common priors. In this paper, we not only show that — with certain infor-
mation structures — increasing disagreement is possible in a Bayesian model, but we also argue
that with the assumption that traders trade for resale — so they try to second guess future traders’
guesses — there are information structures which are simple, intuitive and plausible and result in
increasing disagreement even in a standard, multi-period Grossman—Stiglitz model.
Keywords: confirmatory bias, public announcements, trading volume, higher-order expecta-
tions, short-term traders.
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1 Introduction
It is a well established stylized fact in financial markets that public announcements are followed by
intense trading, high trading volume and volatile prices. This is widely perceived as the sign that the
public announcement increases disagreement, and the polarized asset valuations are channeled into
prices by the hectic trading activity. (Evans and Lyons, 2003 Love and Payne,2003, Fleming and
Remolona,1999, Bamber et al, 1997, Kim and Verrecchia 1997, 1994, 1991, Kandel and Pearson, 1995,
Harris and Raviv, 1993, Varian, 1989). It is also common to argue that agents’ diﬀerent reaction to the
same public information cannot be explained with a standard Bayesian-learning model with common
priors. Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) assume that agents
interpret the same information diﬀerently, because they have diﬀerent priors, while Evans and Lyons
(2003) and Kim and Verrecchia (1997, 1993) suggest a model where the announcement incorporates a
private information element i.e. agents look at the same piece of information but they see something
∗E-mail address: p.kondor@lse.ac.uk. We are grateful for the help received from Gabrielle Demange, Bernardo
Guimaraes, Hyun Song Shin, Gergely Ujhelyi, Dimitri Vayanos and seminar participants at the LSE and at IE-HAS. All
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diﬀerent. In behavioral economics similar phenomena1 are explained by the so-called confirmatory
bias: each agent tends to interpret the same information in a way that supports his or her own view.
Rabin and Schrag (1999) put it as follows:
”... a large and growing body of psychological research suggests that the way people
process information often departs systematically from Bayesian updating. In this paper
we formally model and explore the consequences of one particular departure from Bayesian
rationality: confirmatory bias. [...] The most striking evidence for the confirmatory bias is
a series of experiments demonstrating how providing the same ambiguous information to
people who diﬀer in their initial beliefs on some topic can move their beliefs farther apart.”
Rabin and Schrag(1999, pp 38,43.)
In this paper, we show that with certain information structures a public announcement can increase
disagreement even with standard Bayesian decision makers and common priors. More importantly, we
argue that with early traders who buy for resale — i.e. who trade on their expectation of the expectation
of future traders — there are such information structures for financial markets which are simple, intuitive
and plausible. Hence, we present a Grossman—Stiglitz type standard rational expectation model with
higher-order expectations, where public announcements increase disagreement and hence generate
large trading volume. We also show that our model is consistent with recent evidence — observed in
high-frequency data sets from foreign exchange and fixed income markets — that although at the time
of the announcement there is an initial price adjustment, it is followed by a prolonged period with
increased, more volatile and more informative trading (Evans and Lyons, 2003 Love and Payne,2003,
Fleming and Remolona, 1999, Love 2004). There is also some direct evidence from equity markets
(Bamber et al, 1997), which uses analysts forecast as a proxy for traders opinion, that in line with
our model shows that the increased trading after announcements is indeed associated with increasing
disagreement.
The intuition behind why expectations on expectations of others i.e. higher-order expectations can
be useful to explain increasing disagreement is simple. In the interesting cases of increasing disagree-
ment, agents adjust their beliefs diﬀerently after the public announcement: the same information will
be good news for one agent and bad news for an other agent. However, it is quite a natural intuitive
requirement to assume that good public signals should be associated with strong fundamentals and
vice versa, regardless of the private information. The twist in our model is that our early traders will
not be interested in the true value, they will be interested in the opinion of future traders about the
true value. Hence, high public signals can continue to be associated with strong fundamentals; it is
enough if the same public signal with a particular private piece of information is associated with a
low average private signal of future traders while together with other private signals it is associated
with a high average private signal of future traders. We show that precisely this will be the case, if
the connection between private information sets of agents in diﬀerent periods is not too strong, but
1 In a typical experiment (conducted by Lord, Ross, and Lepper in 1979) two groups of people were given a sequence
of studies on the merits of capital punishment as a deterrent to crime. Individuals in diﬀerent groups had opposite initial
opinion about the issue. After seeing exactly the same information, both groups got even more convinced of their initial
opinion.
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the public signal is related to all agents’ private information. In this case the public information will
connect early traders’ private information to future traders private information. Therefore, before
the public announcement, there will not be too much dispersion among diﬀerently informed early
traders’ guesses on late comers average guess, because early traders’ private information will not be
very informative on late comers’ information. However, at the moment of the public announcement,
their private information gets connected, so informational diﬀerences among early traders spread out
their asset valuation as well. Hence, it is pre-existing private information which becomes relevant in
guessing future traders expectation due to the announcement. As trades are driven by diﬀerences in
information, this newly relevant information diﬀerential is channeled into prices by increased trading
activity. Diﬀerent traders see the same public signal: it just gives significance to their pre-existing
private information, and makes them trade on it.
Our model fits well with the recent flow of applied theoretical papers analyzing the eﬀect of higher-
order expectations on financial markets2. The leading metaphor in this literature is the famous beauty
contest example of Keynes which compares speculative trading to those beauty contests where gifts
are distributed among those who voted for the winner. Similar to the metaphor with the contestants,
the problem of speculative traders is to choose those assets which future traders will consider valuable
— so the resale price will be high —, which does not necessarily coincide with those that they consider
undervalued. The main observation of these papers is that higher-order expectations in asymmetric
information environments may behave very diﬀerently to first-order expectations: the law of iterated
expectations is violated in a systematic way. This fact in turn, can explain stylized facts of financial
markets in a novel way. The first paper in this literature — and the most closely related to our work
— is Allen, Morris and Shin (2003), which shows that assuming short-horizon traders in the standard
dynamic asymmetric information model of Brown and Jennings (1989) implies that prices will be over-
sensitive to public information in the early periods, because higher-order expectations overreacts the
public signal. In the companion paper, Kondor (2004) — similar to this model — allows for an informa-
tion structure, where private information sets of early traders are less connected. As a consequence,
expectations on resale price (higher-order expectations) can move against expectations on fundamental
value (first-order expectations) as traders’ private information changes. Hence, early traders — expect-
ing high resale price of low-value assets — will buy overvalued assets and sell undervalued assets even
if future traders are rational. In the current paper, we concentrate on second moments. The driving
force is the fact that dispersion of higher-order expectations can increase after an announcement even
when dispersion of first-order expectations decreases.
Our work is naturally related to the theoretical work on trading volume and public information
releases. The literature can be divided into two groups. Bayesian models with common priors (Brown
and Jennings, 1989, Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, He and Wang, 1995) do not deliver disagreement
increasing announcements, consequently they have problems explaining the empirical regularities.
The basic structure of these models are nested in our set up, so we will be able to point out the
2This literature originates from the application of results from the global games literature on currency crisis by Morris
and Shin (1998), but recently it has been extended to non-global games environments. In particular, monetary economics
seems to be a fruitful area in the higher-order expectations literature (see Woodford, 2001, Hellwig 2002, Adams, 2003,
Amato and Shin 2003).
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diﬀerence which makes our model capable of explaining high trading volume around announcement.
In contrast, models with heterogenous priors and/or non-Bayesian agents in contrast (Varian, 1986,
Harris and Raviv, 1993, Kandel and Pearson, 1995, Evans and Lyons, 2001) can produce disagreement
and volume, but at the expense of assuming non-common priors or diﬀerent perception of the same
public information. They argue that as standard models are inherently incapable of explaining the
observed stylized facts, these assumptions are necessary. We will show Bayesian models with common
priors can deliver similar findings with the help of higher order expectations.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we connect disagreement increasing
public announcements to higher-order expectations and asset pricing. For expositional purposes, in
that section we abstract from the informational role of prices and we use a simple dynamic structure.
In section 3, we present the full model with learning from prices and more reasonable dynamics and
we discuss the results. In section 4 we confront our findings with existing empirical results. Finally
we conclude.
2 Structures with increasing disagreement and higher-order expec-
tations
In this section, we characterize information structures with increasing disagreement and argue that
such information structures naturally arise in a financial market context where early traders buy for
resale and consequently trade on their expectation of the expectation of future traders. In the first
part, we show the intuition behind our model with the help of a simple example, and we discuss
the crucial property of higher-order expectations from the perspective of this paper. We constrain
ourselves to the normal case in that subsection. In the second part, we analyze the interesting cases of
disagreement increasing public announcements in a general environment and we show why higher-order
expectations provide a convenient way to have increasing disagreement in an asset-pricing model.
2.1 Higher-order expectations and public announcements: an example
Let us present a modified version of Keynes’ beauty contest example.
Example 1 (Restaurant-contest) A newly opened restaurant is assessed. The quality of the restau-
rant, θ, depends on two factors, the quality of food, θf , and the quality of the environment, θe where
θ = θf + θε. There is a one-member-jury, who cannot visit the restaurant, she only makes her judge-
ment by tasting a sample of the food, x = θf + ε. There is also a group of forecasters, j = 1, 2...J,
who guess the judgement of the jury and the one whose guess is closest to the actual judgement gets
a prize. These forecasters have not had the possibility to taste the food yet but each of them visited
the building-site once, each in a diﬀerent phase of the construction. So they have some information
on the environment: xj = θe+ εj We will be interested in the change of dispersion of forecasts before
and after the disclosure of a public piece of information on the quality of the restaurant, y = θ + η,
a review published in the local paper. We assume that the variables θf , θe, ε, εj , η are all have zero
mean and they are independent and normally distributed. Hence, the judgment of the jury will be a
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linear function of her signals. If the review is not published, it will be E (θ|x) = bθx and it will be
E (θ|x, y) = b0θx+ c0θy, if it is published, where bθ, cθ and c0θ are functions of variances and covariances
of the random variables. Without the review forecasters will not have any information on the quality of
the food, hence they will not know anything on the signal of the jury. Hence, forecasts will be identical
across forecasters in a trivial manner:
Ej (E (θ|x) |xj) = Ej (bθx|xj) = bθEj (θf + ε|θe + εj) = 0.
However, if the review is published, there will be dispersion in the opinion of the forecasters as their
forecasts will be sensitive to their private signal
Ej (E (θ|x, y) |xj , y) = Ej
¡
b0θx+ c
0
θy|xj , y
¢
= b0θEj (θf + ε|θe + εj , θe + θf + η) + c0θy =
= b0θ
¡
b0xxj + byy
¢
+ c0θy.
The critical points in our example are that the connection between the information set of the jury
and that of the forecasters is weak (zero) and the public signal is correlated to both. Although our
forecasters have relevant information on the quality of the restaurant, this is not what they have to
guess. They do not have information on the jury’s information. Hence, their guess is simply the a
priori mean of the information of the jury. However, the review connects their information to the
information of the jury. After observing the public information, forecasters can use their private
information. Because their private information diﬀers, so do their forecasts. In particular, those
who think that the environment is very nice — contributing a larger part of a positive review to the
environment factor than they should — will underestimate the quality of the food and the assessment
of the jury3. Those with unfavorable information on the environment will do just the opposite. So
the variance of the forecasts increases due to the review.
In our model, instead of a one-member jury assessing the restaurant there will be a group of traders
who will asses the quality of a risky asset. Their assessment will be reflected in the price of the last
period. Early traders — in the role of the forecasters — will be interested in this price, because they will
be forced to liquidate their positions early, at this price. But for now, let us generalize our example
to see how higher than second-order expectations behave and what are the precise conditions for the
correlation structure for disagreement to increase after an announcement. So, we will assume that
there are many groups of forecasters, t = 1...T, and these groups are ordered, where now the T th group
of forecasters will play the role of the jury. Each of them has to forecast the next group’s average
forecast in the line. For example, a trader j’s forecast with and without the announcement in group
T − 2 will be her third-order expectation
E3 (θ|xT−2,j , y) = Ej
¡
E
¡
E (θ|xT,j , y) |xT−1,j , y
¢ |xT−2,j , y¢ and
E3
¡
θ|xT−2,j
¢
= Ej
¡
E
¡
E (θ|xT,j) |xT−1,j
¢ |xT−2,j¢ ,
3This adverse relationship between the agents’ information on the fundamental and their guess on other’s guess on
the fundamental is the focus in the companion paper of Kondor (2004). In this paper we focus on increasing dispersion
only.
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where E (·) is the average of the forecasts in the group, xt,j is the private signal of agent j in group
t and y is the public announcement. We will still assume normally distributed signals, but we allow
for a more general covariance structure. Let us assume that covariances between any two of our
random variables are positive. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume a symmetric structure,
where the variance of every private signal is σ2x, the covariance between any private signal and the
fundamental value or the public signal are σθ,x and σy,x respectively and all variables have zero mean.
Furthermore, the covariance between two private signals in the same group is σx,x, while the covariance
between private signals in diﬀerent groups is σx,x0 . The only assumption we make on the relative sizes
of covariance and variance terms is that the private signal xit and the public signal, y, are positive
signals4 on θ for agent i in period t in the presence of the public signal i.e. a higher xit or a higher y
will rise the fundamental expectation of agent i:
b0θ =
∂E
¡
θ|xit, y
¢
∂xit
=
σθ,.xσ2y − σx,yσθ,y
σ2xσ2y − σ2x,y
> 0
c0θ =
∂E
¡
θ|xit, y
¢
∂y
=
−σx,θσx,y + σθ,yσ2x
σ2xσ2y − σ2x,y
> 0.
It is easy to check that b0θ, c
0
θ > 0 implies that the private signal is a positive signal on θ in the
no-announcement case as well — i.e. bθ =
∂E(θ|xit)
∂xit
=
σθ,x
σ2x
> 0 — and that |bθ| > |b0θ| . This condition
implies that public announcements will never increase disagreement over the fundamental value i.e.
b0θ, c
0
θ > 0 implies bθ > b
0
θ. In contrast to that, the next proposition shows that all higher-order
expectations become more sensitive to private signal after the announcement, if private information
sets across periods are not too strongly correlated. Hence, dispersion within groups increase due
the announcement. The intuition again is that with higher-order expectations agents’ guess on the
fundamental value does not matter; the critical point is what each agent knows about another agent’s
signal.
Proposition 1 If xit and y are positive signals i.e. bθ, cθ > 0 and
bθρ2x,y¡
bθ + ρθ,x
¡
1− ρ2x,y
¢¢ > ρx0,x, (1)
where ρv1,v2 is the correlation between v1 and v2 then¯¯¯¯
¯∂E
¡
E¯k (θ) |xjt
¢
∂xt
¯¯¯¯
¯ <
¯¯¯¯
¯∂E
¡
E¯k (θ) |xjt, y
¢
∂xt
¯¯¯¯
¯ (2)
holds for all k ≥ 1.
4 In a more general set-up, this assumption would correspond to the asumption of positive aﬃliation of
¡
θ, xit, y
¢
for all
t and i. (Our assumption is weaker, but works for the normal case only.) In terms of aﬃliation, the interesting property
of our information structure is that although
¡
θ, xit, y
¢
is aﬃliated,
¡
xit0 , x
i
t, y
¢
− the system of the public signal and
the private signals of two agents from two diﬀerent periods — is not. This is why belief swap is possible in higher-order
expectations. For a general discussion of similar information structures in an auction context see Jewitt (2004).
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Proof. Let us introduce b0x, and bx for the coeﬃcients of private signals in traders’ conditional
expectations on other traders private signals in other periods:
b0x =
σx,x0σ2y − σ2x,y
σ2xσ2y − σ2x,y
=
∂E
³
xju|xit, y
´
∂xit
for all u 6= t,
bx =
σx,x0
σ2x
=
∂E
³
xju|xit
´
∂xit
for all u 6= t.
Note that ¯¯¯¯
¯∂E
¡
E¯k (θ) |xjt
¢
∂xt
¯¯¯¯
¯ = ¯¯¯bkxbθ ¯¯¯ and
¯¯¯¯
¯∂E
¡
E¯k (θ) |xjt, y
¢
∂xt
¯¯¯¯
¯ = ¯¯¯b0kx b0θ ¯¯¯
As bθ > b0θ > 0, |bx| bθ < |b0x| b0θ implies |bx| < |b0x| . Therefore, |bx| bθ < |b0x| b0θ implies (2). The
condition in the proposition comes directly — after substitution and straightforward manipulation —
from |bnx| bnθ < |bx| bθ.
3 Asset pricing and information structures with increasing disagree-
ment
Before we make the connection to financial applications, let us explore the interesting cases of increas-
ing disagreement due to public information in general. We consider agents indexed by j who have to
form an opinion on an issue. First, let us assume that there are only two agents j = A,B. We assume
a two-step process. They start with the same priors, but in the first step each receives some private
information, Ij . This private information is responsible for the initial disagreement. We ask them for
their opinion, oj at that point. Then a public piece of information, y is also revealed. We ask their
opinion, o0j , again. We are interested in the change in agents’ opinion due to the public information
release. The issue will be represented by the random variable φ. Their initial opinion will be their
expectation of φ given their private information sets:
oj = E (φ|Ij) j = A,B.
Their final opinion is
o0j = E (φ|Ij , y) j = A,B.
With two agents, disagreement can increase after public announcements in four diﬀerent ways. It
is possible that the opinions of both agents improve, but the optimist’s improve more. The same is
possible to the opposite direction. It is also possible that each agent gets even more convinced of his
or her original opinion, and finally, disagreement can also increase when the optimist becomes the
pessimist and vice versa and the change is large enough. The first two cases are rather qualitative
than quantitative phenomena, and they occur quite naturally for certain announcements in most
information structures, so we will not deal with them in this discussion. We will focus on the more
surprising last two possibilities when the public information moves opinions very diﬀerently across
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agents: polarization and belief swap.
Definition 1 There is increasing disagreement for A,B and information y if |o0A − o0B| > |oA − oB| ,
there is polarization for A,B and y if oA > oB implies
o0A > oA and o
0
B ≤ oB.
There is belief swap if oA > oB implies o0A < o
0
B.
It should be clear that polarization implies increasing disagreement, and belief swap can happen
with and without increasing disagreement. In our full model — similar to Example 1 — the public signal
will cause belief swaps together with increasing disagreement for any two agents with diﬀerent private
signals and for any announcement.
To illustrate our concepts, we present a second example. It also demonstrates that there are
environments with increasing disagreement where higher-order expectations do not play a role. There
are two possible public announcements and one of them causes belief swap while the other causes
polarization and both of them result in increasing disagreement.
Example 2 Suppose that investors are waiting for the opinion of a financial analyst on a particular
firm.5 The firm can be valuable (V) or worthless (W). However, the analyst is also one of two types.
It is either an enemy (E), who always gives bad advice, — possibly because some conflicts of interest as
a consequence of being a branch of an investment bank — or a friend (F) who always gives good advice.
The prior distribution about these states is the same for all investors:
V W
F p 1−2p2
E 1−2p2 p
where 14 < p <
1
2 . So the a priori chance of the firm being valuable is
1
2 , but — for some reason — there
is some correlation between the type of the analyst and the type of the firm: valuable firms tend to
go to friend analysts and vice-versa. There are two steps of information arrivals. First each investor
receives a noisy information i about the type of the analyst. Let us assume that iA = F and iB = E.
This signal is true with probability 1 > q > 12 . After this signal, we ask investors about their probability
assessment of the firm being a valuable investment possibility:oA, oB. In the second step the analyst
announces its report which is either that the firm is valuable, y = V, or that the firm is worthless,
y = W. We assume that the agency knows the value of the firm for certain. We ask the investors
5We thank Enrico Sette for this interpretation of our example.
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again: o0A, o
0
B. It is easy to check by Bayes’ Rule that
before announcement after announcement V after announcement W
investor A: oA, o0A 4qp+ 1− 2p− q q 1− q
investor B: oB, o0B 2p− 4qp+ q 1− q q
diﬀerence: o(0)A − o
(0)
B (4p− 1) (2q − 1) > 0 2q − 1 1− 2q
Hence, we have polarization, if y = V, belief swap if y =W, and disagreement increase in both cases.
Note, that the restaurant-contest example is analogous in many respects to this one. Although
in the first example the pay-oﬀ relevant state for the forecasters is the judgement of the jury, while
here it is the quality of the firm. And although their private information is about the environment
of the restaurant while here it is about the type of the analyst, the critical points remain the same.
In both cases the private signal itself does not give too much information about the relevant variable:
the public information, i.e. the review about the restaurant or the announcement of the analyst,
makes the diﬀerence. Furthermore, conditionally on the pay-oﬀ relevant state, the public information
is not independent of the private information: the announcement of the analyst means something
diﬀerent for the two agents and the published review means something diﬀerent for the forecasters.
However, the two examples do diﬀer in a very important way. In this second example, we need very
specific public announcements. We have to assume that the announcer is either an enemy or a friend
and the decision makers have diﬀerent private information on the type of the announcer. In the
rest of this section, we will show that these strong assumptions are not specific to our example; we
need similar ones to generate increasing disagreement in models without higher-order expectations.
It would be very hard to find an analogue to this set-up in financial markets. In contrast, in the
first example higher-order expectations help us to have increasing disagreement without having such
strong assumptions on the type of the announcer. We only need some agents who enter earlier and form
expectations on the opinion of late-entrants, not too correlated private information sets across groups
and public announcements which is correlated with all private information sets. We will argue later
that these are very plausible assumptions for financial markets. In eﬀect, we substitute assumptions
on the information structure for assumptions on the time of entry and exit of traders. This is the
main idea of the paper.
From now on, let us assume that the private piece of information of each individual i, consists of a
single private signal xi, and there are infinitely many agents. The distribution of the pay-oﬀ relevant
state φ, the vector of public signals y and private signals xi is characterized by the density function
f (φ, xi, y) . Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that conditional on φ and y, private signals are
drawn independently from the same distribution. Furthermore, we assume that the marginal density
function of any subset of our random variables exists and is also diﬀerentiable with respect to any of
our variables and all of these densities have a full support on a given closed state space S ⊆ R2+ny
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where ny is the dimension of y 6. Let us also assume that
∂2 ln f(φ|xi)
∂φ∂xi
> 0 so from Milgrom (1981)7
E (φ|xi) is increasing in xi. It is then not too hard to give simple suﬃcient conditions for belief swap
and polarization.
Proposition 2 1. If
∂ ln f (y|φ, x00)
∂φ
> 0 but
∂ ln f (y|φ, x0)
∂φ
< 0 for all φ
then there is polarization for the given x00 > x0 and y., where x0, x00, y, φ ∈ S.
2. If
−∂
2 ln f (y|φ, x)
∂φ∂x
<
∂2 ln f (φ|x)
∂φ∂x
for the given y and all φ, x ∈ S then there is belief swap for y and for all x.
Proof. From Milgrom (1981), if ∂ ln g1(φ)∂φ >
∂ ln g2(φ)
∂φ where g1 (·) , g2 (·) are two distribution func-
tions, then E1 (φ) > E2 (φ) holds. Hence, for polarization, it is suﬃcient if
∂ ln f (φ|x00, y)
∂φ
>
∂ ln f (φ|x00)
∂φ
and
∂ ln f (φ|x0, y)
∂φ
<
∂ ln f (φ|x0)
∂φ
.
Similarly, for belief swap it is suﬃcient if
∂2 ln f (φ|x, y)
∂φ∂x
< 0 <
∂2 ln f (φ|x)
∂φ∂x
.
But
ln f (φ|x, y) = ln f (φ, x, y)
f (x, y)
= ln
f (y|φ, x) f (φ|x)
f (y|x) =
= ln f (y|φ, x) + ln f (φ|x)− ln f (y|x) ,
which — by substituting back into the inequalities above — gives all the results.
Our conditions are in line with the intuition provided by our second example. There is polarization
if the public announcement is good news if the agent knows x00 but bad news if she knows x0.8
6The generalization of any of the results below for the discrete case would be a straightforward exercise.
7 It is that f (θ|xi) is log-supermodular in θ and xi or that the log-likelihood ratio property is satisfied: f(θ
00|x00)
f(θ0|x00) >
f(θ00|x0)
f(θ0|x0) for all θ
00 > θ0 and x00 > x0. As it is shown in Milgrom (1981), this is suﬃcient condition for second order
stochastic dominance and consequently is suﬃcient for E (θ|x) to be increasing in x.
8Milgrom (1981) uses the definition that news z00 is more favourable than z iﬀ
f (z00|θ00)
f (z00|θ0) >
f (z0|θ00)
f (z0|θ0) or
∂ ln f (z00|θ)
∂θ
>
∂ ln f (z0|θ)
∂θ
.
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Furthermore, there is belief swap if the larger the x, the worse news is y and if this eﬀect is strong
relative to the eﬀect of the private signal on the probability of φ in the absence of public information.
Although we cannot find similarly simple conditions for disagreement increase in general, propo-
sition 2 helps us to connect higher-order expectations, structures with disagreement increase and
asset-pricing in the simplest CARA-Normal world. So let us turn to our financial application and
use the simplest possible asset-pricing model with asymmetric information. Now, our agents will be
traders in a market of a risky asset. They will trade for one period only. Instead of the eﬀect of the
public announcement on their opinion, we will be interested in its eﬀect on their demand for the asset.
Each agent has a constant absolute risk-aversion utility Uj (Wj) = −e−ajWj , where Wj is their end of
period wealth, and aj is the measure of risk-aversion. Here, the issue, φ, which they form an opinion
on, will be the value of the asset at the end of the period. There is a random supply of the asset,
so prices are not fully revealing. A trader j will receive a private signal xj and possibly the public
information y.We assume that all random variables are jointly normal and that traders are symmetric
i.e. the distribution of xi conditional on the other variables are the same across all i.
Then the demand of trader j in period t will be
dj =
E (φ|xj , p)− p
ajvar (φ|xj , p)
if there is no announcement and
d0j =
E (φ|xj , p, y)− p
avar (φ|xj , y, p)
if there is announcement. These expressions show the familiar relationship that the larger the dis-
agreement — the numerator — or the larger the precision — smaller the denominator — the larger is the
position. As precision increases, by the arrival of the announcement, increasing disagreement leads to
larger positions. Similarly, it is clear that the speculative trading volume will be larger9, if each trader
trades more aggressively due to the announcement i.e. trading intensity increases:¯¯¯¯
∂dj
∂xj
¯¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯¯
∂d0j
∂xj
¯¯¯¯
.
Because of linearity of demand functions, this will be satisfied either for all agents or for none of them.
Furthermore, — because variance is independent of the realized signal — this is exactly the condition
for increasing disagreement between any two of the agents in the same group.
For the rest of the section, let us assume that traders do not learn from prices. There will be
learning from prices in the full model, here we abstract it away only to strengthen our intuition. Now,
In that sense, our suﬃcient condition for polarization can be interpreted that z is more favourable when our agent knows
x00 than if she knows x0.
9We will be more precise on the definition of trading volume and its relation to speculative trades and risk-sharing
trades later in the text. The present discussion is intended to remain on an intuitive level.
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we can make two observations. The first one is, that with normally distributed variables
∂dj
∂xj
=
1
aj
∂E(φ|xj)
∂xj
var (φ|xjt) =
1
aj
∂2 ln f (φ|xj)
∂φ∂xj
∂d0j
∂xj
=
1
aj
∂E(φ|xj ,y)
∂xj
var (φ|xj , y) =
1
ajt
∂2 ln f (φ|xj , y)
∂φ∂xj
.
As we know that
ln f (φ|xj , y) = ln f (y|φ, xj) + ln f (φ|xj , y)− ln f (y|xj) ,
we also know that
∂d0j
∂xj
=
∂dj
∂xj
+
1
aj
∂2 ln f (y|φ, xj)
∂φ∂xj
=
∂dj
∂xj
−
∂E(y|φ,xj)
∂xj
∂E(y|φ,xj)
∂φ
ajtvar (y|φ, xj) .
With the logic of proposition 2, this equation gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for increasing
disagreement with belief swap in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When prices are not informative, traders will reverse their bets due to the announce-
ment, if and only if
∂E(y|φ,xj)
∂x
∂E(y|φ,x)
∂φ
ajvar (y|φ, xj) >
∂dj
∂xj
=
1
aj
∂E(φ|xj)
∂xj
var (φ|xjt) (3)
and they also trade more aggressively if and only if
∂E(y|φ,xj)
∂xj
∂E(y|φ,xjt)
∂φt
ajvar (y|φ, xj) > 2
∂dj
∂xj
=
2
aj
∂E(φ|xj)
∂xj
var (φ|xjt) . (4)
The last expression shows, why a structure with higher-order expectations with early-traders and
latecomers, can result in increasing trading activity after an announcement as opposed to other mod-
els. Conditions (3) and (4) will hold if ∂E(y|φ,xj)∂xj
∂E(y|φt,xjt)
∂φt
is large. It means that φ and x contain
complementary information on the public signal y. In a standard model without higher-order expec-
tations every agent is interested in the fundamental value, θ, so φ = θ. Then finding an information
structure where private signals contain additional information to the true value on the public signal is
very demanding10. For example, with the usual assumption that the announcement is a noisy version
of the true value, y = θ+ η, where η is uncorrelated to xj , the private signal cannot possibly improve
the estimation of the public signal beyond the true value, i.e. ∂E(y|φ,xj)∂xT =
∂E(y|θ,x)
∂xT
= 0. In contrast, we
may assume that there are early trader indexed by j and latecomers indexed by i. Early traders arrive
10However, an information structure, where φ = θ and still the private signal improves the estimate E (y|θ, xj) ,
is certainly possible. For example, in Verrecchia (1997) agents have private information on the error in the public
announcement, so
∂E(y|θ,xj)
∂xj
6= 0. Still, given that for more aggressive trading, we need ∂E(y|θ,xj)∂xj to be large enough
compared to
∂E(θ|xj)
∂xj
, we believe that this argument is much more demanding in terms of informational assumptions
than our own.
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first, they trade then they sell their holdings to latecomers who trade and liquidate for the true value
θ. Thus an early trader is interested in the second period price, not the true value: φj = p2 = f (xi) ,
which will be a function of the information of last period traders only. Hence, on the left hand side of
conditions (3) and (4) we will have
∂E(y|p2,xj)
∂xj
∂E(y|p2,xjt)
∂p2
ajvar (y|φ, xj) =
∂E(y|f(xi),xj)
∂xj
∂E(y|f(xi)t,xjt)
∂f(xi)
ajvar (y|f (xi) , xj)
Conditions (3) and (4) will hold if these expressions are large enough. It means that xj should give
additional information on y apart from the information contained in p2 = f (xi) should give additional
information on y apart from that contained in xj . This will be possible if xj and xi are not too related
to each other, but both of them are related to y. This is exactly the case both in Example 1 and in
our full model in the next section.
4 The model
4.1 The set-up
We modify a standard, dynamic, CARA-Normal, rational expectations model with diﬀerential in-
formation (e.g. He and Wang, 1995, Brown and Jennings, 1989). As in any similar model since
Grossman-Stiglitz (1980), preferences of our traders are given by Ui (Wi) = −e−aWi , where Wi is
monetary wealth at the time of the exit, a is the absolute risk-aversion parameter and in each period
traders submit demand curves to an auctioneer to buy up the random supply of assets: ut˜N
³
0, 1
δ2t
´
.
Traders base their portfolio decision on the private signal which they receive at the moment of their
entry and all available public signals i.e. past and present prices and public announcements. They
update their beliefs by Bayes’ Rule. Prices, pt, are determined by market clearing.
However, as a non-standard assumption, we will have two groups of traders — with continuum
traders in each group — and 2+1 periods (t = 0, 1, 2). Traders in the first group trade among themselves
in periods 0 and 1 and sell all of their remaining assets in period 2. Traders in the second group trade
among each other in period 2 and liquidate for the uncertain value of θ at the end of the game. For
expositional purposes only, let us interpret our model in terms of a 24-hour day in the USD/GBP
market. However, the reader should keep in mind that our set up would fit to any market, where
traders focus on the resale value of their assets instead of their fundamental value. With the FX
interpretation, the first group represents traders based in London, while the second group is based
in New York. Period 0 and 1 are daylight periods in London, so Londoners trade among themselves
twice, and then they go to sleep, so they sell all their holdings to New Yorkers. They do not hold
positions overnight11. Period 2 is daylight in New York, so New Yorkers trade among themselves and
get θ in the evening. We assume that if there is a public announcement, y, then it will be released at
the beginning of period 1. Hence, we will focus on the diﬀerences in trading patterns of Londoners
11Although we use the interpretation of a 24-hour FX market only for expositional reasons, it happens to be a stylized
fact among FX dealers that they do not hold positions overnight (see Lyons, 2001).
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(early traders) with and without an announcement.
The driving force of our model lies in the information structure. We assume that the fundamental
value of the asset — the exchange rate in this interpretation— is given by
θ = θs + θk + θw
where θs, θk, θw are the US factor, the UK factor and the world factor respectively. We assume that
the private signal that Londoners receive contains noisy information on the UK factor and the world
factor, but does not contain information on the US factor: xi = θk + θw + εi, while the private
signals of New Yorkers contain information on the US factor and the world factor, but not on the
UK factor: zj = θs + θw + εj . Hence, the world factor simply represents the common element in
the information set of agents in diﬀerent groups, while the US factor and the UK factor represent
group-specific information. The public signal contains information on fundamental value: y = θ + η.
We assume that all factors and noise terms are i.i.d. and normally distributed:
θk, θs ∼ N
µ
0,
1
κ
¶
, θw ∼ N
µ
0,
1
ω
¶
, εi, εj ∼ N
µ
0,
1
α
¶
, η ∼ N
µ
0,
1
β
¶
.
As we will see, our model gives new insights when ω is large i.e. when the common component in the
information structure is relatively small. Intuitively, high-ω case describes a situation, where agents in
diﬀerent groups has information of diﬀerent parts of the big picture, while the public signal is about
the big picture. We believe that this is a fairly typical case. After all, while the public signal is
mostly about aggregates, like macroeconomic indicators on the FX market or earning announcements
in the stock market, private information is usually about some specific factors of the asset value. For
example, in the case of a dealer in the foreign exchange, the typical piece of private information would
be the change of order flow of her particular consumer base (see Lyons, 2001), or in the case of an
insider at the stock market it would be some information about the outcome of a particular project or
a transaction. As another dealer has a diﬀerent consumer base — possibly with diﬀerent characteristics
— and an other insider might have information about a diﬀerent transaction, these pieces of private
information are arguably not very correlated across agents in diﬀerent groups.
It is instructive to compare our structure to information in other rational expectations models.
The following table presents the structure of some of the most prominent models in the literature.
model private s. public s. liquidation v.
Brown-Jennings(1989) Kim-Verrecchia(1991,1994) θ + εi θ + η θ
He and Wang(1995) θ + εi θ + η θ + ξ
Note, that all these models, together with the majority of asymmetric information models in finance
12, use a one-factor framework. The problem is that the assumption that all signals are noisy versions
of the fundamental, imposes a very rigid structure on information sets. Namely, all covariances
12Foster and Viswanathan (1996) is a notable exception. For a detailed review of the literature, see Brunnermeier
(2001).
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between any two of the random variables equals the variance of the fundamental value: cov (xi, xj) =
cov (xi, y) = cov (xi, θ) = var (θ). Our structure represents a partial relaxation of this assumption.
We allow for weaker correlation between private signals across groups. We presented the structure
with the help of a specific story about the FX traders just for exponential purposes. We believe that
our model applies to any financial markets, where traders cannot be sure to be able to hold their
positions until it is optimal and where those to whom they will sell, do not necessarily have a very
similar information set to theirs.
In the one-factor structure, disagreement never increases due to an announcement. In particular,
in the simplest Brown and Jennings model, there is no eﬀect of public announcement at all: increased
precision and decreased disagreement exactly cancels out. In the Kim-Verrecchia (1991) case there
is some volume due to diﬀerent precision of signals of diﬀerent traders, but the eﬀect is small and
always proportional to the price change. In He and Wang (1995), there is an additional random factor
in the liquidation value, ξ, which is not included in the union of the traders’ information set. This
induces traders to follow a more complex dynamic strategy over time, which allows traders to bet in
advance on the price eﬀect of the public announcement. Hence, they will build up positions before
the announcement and liquidate these positions when the announcement is released. This eﬀect works
only with expected announcements. Our model will deliver this bet-in-advance eﬀect as well, but
we will have an additional eﬀect coming from increased disagreement, which will work even if the
announcement is unexpected.
Our model nests the information structures of these standard models. The next table summarizes
the connections.
our parameter private public fundamental p2 (·) model
κ, δ2 →∞ θw + εi θw + η θw ≈ θw Brown-Jennings(1989),
Kim-Verrecchia(1991,1994)
κ→∞ θw + εi θw + η θw ≈ θw + u2 He-Wang (1995)
ω →∞ θk + εi θs + η θk + θs ≈ θs + u2 independent information sets
When κ → ∞, the non-common factors, θs, θk lose their importance and we end up in a one-factor
structure with θw only. When also δ2 → ∞, second period price, p2, will be fully revealing, so
Londoners will behave as if they could liquidate for θw, which is the only relevant factor remaining.
Hence, in the case of κ, δ2 →∞, eﬀectively we have a two period model with one factor as in Brown
and Jennings. When δ2 is finite, the model resembles to that of He and Wang (1995) as the liquidation
value for Londoners, p2, will contain the random term u2 as well. However, when only ω → ∞, we
have a diﬀerent structure, very similar to Example 1, where private information sets of Londoners and
New Yorkers get separated. As we will show in the next section: the larger ω, the larger the eﬀect of
increasing disagreement.
4.2 Analytical results
In the first part of this section, we show that equilibrium of the model exists. In the second part, we
present results on the equilibrium volume.
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4.2.1 Equilibrium and existence
We search for a linear equilibrium, so we assume that prices are given by the functions
p2 = c2y + b2 (θs + θw) + f2q1 + g2q0 − e2u2 (5)
p1 = c1y + b1 (θk + θw) + f1q0 − e1u1
p0 = b0 (θk + θw)− e0u0
where ct, bt, et, f1, f2, g2 are undetermined coeﬃcients, while q1, q0 are specified below. Prices to-
gether with past prices and the public information are informationally equivalent with the following
price signals
q2 =
1
b2
(p2 − c2y − f2q1 − g2q0) = (θs + θw)−
e2
b2
u2 (6)
q1 =
1
b1
(p1 − c1y − f1q0) = (θk + θw)−
e1
b1
u1
q0 =
1
b0
p0 = (θk + θw)−
e0
b0
u0.
Below, we will show that the equilibrium trading activity is determined only by the noisiness of
these price signals, so we define τ2t as the precision of qt:
1
τ2t
=
e2t
b2t δ
2
t
or
τ t
δt
=
bt
et
.
Let us also define the following coeﬃcients of variables in traders’ information sets in diﬀerent
conditional expectations of New Yorkers and Londoners:
E (θ|zj , y, q2, q1, q0) = b¯zj + c¯y + e¯q2 + f¯q1 + g¯q0 (7)
E (θs + θw|xi, y, q1, q0) = bsxi + csy + esq1 + fsq0 (8)
E (θ|xi, q0) = E (θk + θw|xi, q0) = E (q1|xi, q0) = E (y|xi, q0) = byxi + eyq0. (9)
From standard results (e.g. Brown and Jennings, 1989), we know that demand functions of New
Yorkers in period 2 and Londoners in period 1 will be
dj2 =
E (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0)− p2
avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0) =
c¯y + b¯xj + f¯ q1 + e¯q2 + g¯q0 − p2
avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0) (10)
di1 =
E (p2|xi, y, p1, q0)− p1
avar (p2|xi, y, p1, q0) =
c2y + b2 (bsxi + csy + esq1 + fsq0) + f2q1 + g2q0 − p1
avar (p2|xi, y, p1, q0) (11)
Finding the demand function in period 0 is a bit more subtle. Londoners maximize the following
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expected utility in period 0:
E
µ
− exp
µ
−a (p1 − p0) d1 −
E (p2|q1, y, xj , q0)− p1
avar (p2|q1, y, xj , q0) (p2 − p1)
¶
|xi, q0
¶
.
The source of the diﬃculty is that there are two random variables in this expression, p1 (or q1) and y.
In the appendix, we show that as the outcome of this maximization — the demand function in period
0 — is
di0 =
(E (p1|xi, q0)− p0) (σqs+ 1) + bsE
¡
di1|xi, q0
¢
(c1σyq + b1σq)
a
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢ (12)
where Ã
σy σyq
σyq σq
!
= var
ÃÃ
y
q1
!
|xi, q0
!
is the variance-covariance matrix of y and q1 conditional on a London-trader’s information set in
period 0. Intuitively, the first part in expression (12) represents the short-term demand component,
while the second part represents the hedging component for demand in period 1.
We can show that in equilibrium, demand functions can be characterized completely by the equi-
librium values of τ t in the following manner:
dj2 =
τ2
δ2
(zj − q2) =
τ2
δ2
εj + u2 (13)
di1 =
τ1
δ1
(xi − q1) =
τ1
δ1
εi + u1 (14)
di0 =
τ0
δ0
(xi − q0) =
τ0
δ0
εi + u0. (15)
The right hand sides of the three equations show that in each period, total positions consist of two
parts. There is a risk-sharing part, ut, which is purchased by each agent regardless of her information,
and there is a speculative part, τ tδt εi, which depends on the diﬀerence between the agent’s signal
and the true value of the factor, εi or εj , and the coeﬃcient τ tδt . It is apparent that
τ t
δt determines
how intensively the trader uses her private information to bet against the others, so we will label this
fraction as trading intensity in period t. In particular, an optimistic trader will hold a positive position
if τ tδt is positive and hold a negative position of
τ t
δt is negative. So trading activity and volume will
depend how these coeﬃcients change across periods. Here, we only present the steps which lead to
(13). Expressions (14) and (15) are obtained very similarly.
From (10), the market clearing condition is
D2 =
c¯y + b¯ (θs + θw) + f¯ q1 + e¯q2 + g¯q0 − p2
avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0) = u2.
Using (6) and rearranging gives
c¯y + b¯ (θs + θw) + f¯ q1 + e¯q2 + g¯q0 − avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0)u2 = b2q2 + c2y + f2q1 + g2q0.
As the two sides have to be equal in equilibrium for any realizations of u1, u2 and η,
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c2 = c¯, f2 = f¯ , and g2 = g¯ (16)
must hold. This implies
b¯
e2
b2
(θs + θw)− avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0) e2b2u2 = (b2 − e¯)
e2
b2
q2.
As q2 = θs + θw − e2b2u2, this gives us
b¯
avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0) =
b2
e2
=
(b2 − e¯)
avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0) ,
consequently,
b2 = b¯+ e¯. (17)
Note, that expressions (16) and (17) determine the equilibrium value of the coeﬃcients in the price
function,(5), in terms of coeﬃcients of the conditional expectation of θ. If we substitute out p2, c2, g2, f2
from the left hand side of (10), we get
E (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0)− p2 = b2 (zj − q2) ,
which — together with the definition of τ2 and q2 — implies
di2 =
b¯ (zj − q2)
avar (θ|zj , y, p2, q1, q0) =
τ2
δ2
(zj − q2) =
τ2
δ2
εj + u2. (18)
Very similar steps applied to (11) and (12) gives us
di1 =
1
ab2
bs
vari (θs + θk) + 1τ22
(xi − q1) =
τ1
δ1
(xi − q1) =
τ1
δ1
εi + u1 (19)
di0 =
(σqs+ 1)
³
(c1 + b1) by + s (1− by) c1σyq+b1σqσqs+1
´
a
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢ (xi − q0) = τ0δ0 (xi − q0) = τ0δ0 εi + u0 (20)
From this procedure — similar to expressions (16) and (17) — we also gain expressions for c1 and
b1 in terms of coeﬃcients of the conditional expectations (7)-(9)13. All of these, together with the
expectational coeﬃcients are given in the appendix. The last step is to find the equilibrium trading
intensities,τ tδt , which give the equilibrium demand functions. For this, we simply plug in expressions
for bs, b¯,b2 and conditional variances into (18) and (19) and equate the coeﬃcients of (zj−q2), (xi − q1)
and (xi − q0) in the two sides of the equations (18)-(20). This gives a system of three equations with
the three unknowns of τ1, τ2, τ0 :
τ2 = f2 (τ2, τ1, τ0) (21)
13Actually, we also obtain similar expressions for the other coeﬃcients in the price functions — e2, f1, e1, b0, e0 — but as
they are not relevant for our purposes, we omit them to save space.
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τ1 =
¡
κ2 − ωβ
¢
f1 (τ2, τ1, τ0)
τ0 = f
0 (τ2, τ1, τ0) . (22)
where f0 (τ2, τ1, τ0) , f1 (τ2, τ1, τ0) and f2 (τ2, τ1, τ0) are well defined functions and both f1 (τ2, τ1, τ0)
and f2 (τ2, τ1, τ0) are positive for any τ2, τ1, τ0. Their exact form is given in the appendix. It is easy
to check that the corresponding equilibrium intensities when there is no announcement will be given
by the same equations by setting β = 0. When it could cause misunderstanding, we will distinguish
between τ2, τ1, τ0 of the announcement and the no-announcement cases by the subscript n, for no-
announcement. Furthermore, it is apparent for the announcement case that τ1 will be negative when
ω is large: there will be belief swap. So in the latter case optimistic early traders will hold a positive
position before the announcement (τn0 > 0), but in the case of an announcement they will sell massively,
ending up with a negative position (τ1 < 0). We will return to the intuition of this case in the next
section.
Hence, the equilibrium exists if and only if this system of equations has a fix point. The following
proposition states that this will be the case for any parameter values.
Theorem 1 (Existence) From (21)-(22) any equilibrium is a fixed-point of a system:
τ2 = f2 (τ2, τ1, τ0) , τ1 =
¡
κ2 − ωβ
¢
f1 (τ2, τ1, τ0) , τ0 = f0 (τ2, τ1, τ0)
There is always at least one equilibrium of this system both for the announcement and the no-
announcement cases.
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix.
4.2.2 Announcement and volume
As the focus of this paper is the eﬀect of announcement on trading volume, we will be interested in the
change of volume in period 1 due to the announcement. From equations (11) and (12), the amount of
trading of trader i in period 1 will be given by
vi1 = d
i
1 − di0 =
µ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶
εi − u0 + u1.
Just as total positions, the total amount of trade of individual i consist of two parts. There is an
information-independent risk-sharing part, u1−u0, and there is a speculative part
³
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
´
εi, which
is determined by the diﬀerence of trading intensities in the two periods and the private information of
the trader. If we aggregate across traders, we get the following expression for total volume in period
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1:
V1 =
1
2
Z ¯¯
di1 − di0
¯¯
di =
1
2
Z
³
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
´
εi>u0−u1
µµ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶
εi + u1 − u0
¶
φ (αεi) dεi−
− 1
2
Z
³
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
´
εi<u0−u1
µµ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶
εi + u1 − u0
¶
φ (αεi) dεi =
=
¯¯¯¯µ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶¯¯¯¯
1√
α
φ (T ) + sgn
µ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶
(u1 − u0)
1
2
(1− 2Φ (T ))
with T = α u0−u1³ τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
´ ,where we used the result that if ζ ∼ N ¡µ, σ2¢ , then
Z
ζ>L
ζ
φ
³
ζ−µ
σ
´
Φ (α)
dζ = E (ζ|ζ > L) = µ+ σλ (α)
with λ (α) = φ(α)1−Φ(α) and α =
L−µ
σ .
Hence, aggregate volume depends only on the realization of u1 − u0, the precision of the private
signals α, and the distance between trading intensities,
¯¯¯³
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
´¯¯¯
. As the first one is unrelated to
information or announcements, we will focus on the speculative volume, which we define as the volume
when there is no risk-sharing trade:
V S1 = V1|u0=u1 =
¯¯¯¯
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¯¯¯¯
1√
α2π
. (23)
It must be clear now that — for results on the eﬀect of announcement on speculative volume — we
only have to compare the change in trading intensities in the announcement case,
¯¯¯
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
¯¯¯
, and the
no-announcement case,
¯¯¯
τn1
δ1
− τ
n
0
δ0
¯¯¯
. The main result of this paper is that the outcome of this comparison
will depend heavily and systematically on the information structure i.e. on the relative importance
of the common factor, θw, and the individual factors θs, θk. The following proposition shows that as
individual factors become less important and the common factor becomes more important, volume
disappears. This result is in line with our earlier observation that in a rational model with one factor
trading volume around announcements is small, because the eﬀects of increasing precision of opinions
and decreasing disagreement cancel out.
Proposition 4 As δ2, κ→∞
τ2
δ2
=
τ1
δ1
=
τ0
δ0
=
τn2
δ2
=
τn1
δ1
=
τn0
δ0
=
α
a
,
hence V1 = V n1 = 0 in this limit.
Proof. For τ2δ2 ,
τ1
δ1
, τ
n
2
δ2
and τ
n
1
δ1
, the result comes from the simple observation that the ordered limit
lim
δ2→∞
lim
κ→∞
f2 (τ2, τ1, τ0) =
α
a
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and after substitution of τ2 = αa
lim
δ2→∞
lim
κ→∞
f1 (τ2, τ1, τ0) =
α
a
.
The result for τ0δ0 and
τn0
δ0
can be obtained in a similar, but much more tedious way, if we take the limit
of all the building-blocks of f0 (τ2, τ1, τ0) and plug them in.
We confront this result with the next proposition, where we show that if one measures the ef-
fect of announcement by the proportion of volume in the announcement case to volume in the no-
announcement case, this proportion will be arbitrary large as the common factor, θw, loses its impor-
tance. The same is true for the proportion of speculative positions in both periods.
Proposition 5 If ω is large enough Ds1 =
1
2
R ¯¯¯ τ1
δ0
εi
¯¯¯
di > 12
R ¯¯¯ τn1
δ0
εi
¯¯¯
di = Dn1 and V1 > V
n
1 and as
ω →∞ ,D1Dn1 →∞ ,
D0
Dn0
→∞ . Furthermore, V1V n1 →∞ (for almost all parameters).
Proof. The proof is in the appendix.
The intuition of this result is the same as in Example 1. Similar to the example, where two
independent factors determined the quality of the restaurant, let us suppose here that ω is large, so
the common factor, θw is unimportant, i.e. only the individual factors, θs and θk matter. Traders
can bet only on those variables that are not part of the public information set. From the Londoners
point of view in period 1 (the second period when they trade), the only variable in p2 which is not
part of the public information set — apart from the noise, u2 — is θs. But first period traders have no
information on θs, only on θk. Hence, they will agree that they do not know anything (i.e. their guess
will be the a priori mean, 0), and there will be agreement and no speculative trade. But if Londoners
do not trade on their private information, their private information cannot be channelled into prices,
so p1 will be pure noise. So if we go back one period, in period 0, Londoners should bet on p1 and p2,
but they do not have any information neither on p1, as it is pure noise, nor on p2, because they do not
know anything about θs. Hence, there will be no speculative trade in period 0 either. It means that
speculative volume, the diﬀerence between individual speculative positions in period 0 and period 1,
will also be zero. However, with public announcement the situation changes. Public announcement is
y ≈ θs + θk + η, if θw is unimportant. So Londoners will have some information on the sum of θs and
θk. But together with their private information on θk, it gives them some information on θs. What is
more is that as they have diﬀerent guesses on θk due to their diﬀerent private signals, their guesses
on θs will also be diﬀerent. Therefore, public announcement increases disagreement. In particular, an
early trader with a high private signal, will overestimate θk, so for a given y ≈ θs + θk + η, will under
estimate θs. This is why, the observation of the public signal will make her to hold a negative position
i.e. to sell assets. With the opposite logic as in the no-announcement case, there will be trade in all
periods and there will be volume.
4.3 Numerical Results
We calculated numerically the fix point of the system (21)-(22) with several parameter combinations.
A typical graph of trading intensities τ tδt and
τnt
δt
is shown in Figure 1. As we mentioned, the absolute
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Figure 1: Trading intensities in periods 0 and 1 in the cases of announcement and no-announcement
(the coeﬃcient of εi in the expression dit) as the information set of traders across groups becomes more
separated i.e. ω increases. Parameter values are δ2 = κ = 5, α = β = δ1 = δ0 = 1.
size of these coeﬃcients is proportional to the absolute size of positions of our traders, while their sign
shows the shows whether an optimistic trader desires to hold a positive or a negative position. The
middle two lines are τ
n
0
δ0
and τ
n
1
δ1
(the trading intensity in the no-announcement case in period 1 and
0). Both goes to 0 as ω →∞ as it is stated in the proof of Proposition 5 and in line with our intuitive
story when θw is unimportant. With announcement, in period 0 traders bet intensively on the size
of y based on their private information (line with asterisk), and in period 1 they bet intensively on
p2 (solid line). The larger the distance between the two lines, the larger the trading volume around
announcements. When ω is small, we are close to the standard information case (one factor model).
It is apparent that at this extreme, all lines are almost equal, so trading volume is small. If κ and
δ2 would be large enough, all lines would coincide as it is stated in Proposition 4. It is spectacular
that as ω grows — private information sets become separated across groups — the lines corresponding
to the announcement cases fan out. This shows the potential of our story in explaining the jump in
trading volume around announcements. The change of the sign of the solid line shows, how the desired
position of an optimistic early trader changes after the announcement. When the common component
is important, her optimistic view on the common component dominates her pessimistic view about
θs. As the importance of the common component disappears, the second eﬀect will dominate, just
as in Example 1 or just as we described in the previous section. In this case trading volume will be
particularly high, because early traders with high signals change their long position to short position
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(from the stared line to the solid line) as a result of the announcement across periods 0 and 1, while
early traders with low private signals do the opposite.
5 Confrontation to stylized facts from the empirical literature
In this section, we will confront our results to empirical evidence on the eﬀect of public announcements
on trading activity. Firstly, we consider well-established results from high-frequency data and the
puzzle of increasing trading without price changes. Then we turn briefly to the work of Bamber et
al (1997), which is of special interest for us as it attempts to connect the change in trading activity
directly to measures of disagreement.
Recent evidence from high-frequency data-sets (Evans and Lyons, 2001,2003, Love and Payne,
2003, Love 2004, Fleming and Remolona, 1999) show a prolonged intense trading period after an-
nouncements when
1. there is a simultaneous increase in buying orders and selling orders14
2. order flows, the diﬀerence between buying and selling orders, are more volatile
3. order flows are more informative i.e. they influence price formation more.
Let us include also a fourth stylized fact which Kandel and Person (1995) found inconsistent
with rational models on the basis of the model of Kim and Verrecchia (1991,1994).
4. There is a jump in trading volume due to the announcement, even if there is no corresponding
price change.
Our rational expectations model is of a reduced form. All traders submit whole demand schedules
and orders are executed on the market-clearing price. Hence, in our model there is no order flow.
In reality, a market maker neither observes whole demand schedules nor observes all of them at the
same time. She has to map them through time. She quotes a price that is good for any amount, some
traders make transactions on this price, and the market-maker updates her quote depending on the
received orders. Order flow is like the aggregate trades of a small group of traders executed at a close-
to-equilibrium price. We believe that the nearest we can get in our model to the behaviour of order
flow, is to consider the behaviour of individual orders at equilibrium price, because the aggregation of
a small number of trades must have similar characteristics to the parts of this aggregation. Firstly, we
will argue that if one is willing to accept individual trades as a proxy for order flow, then our model
is consistent with the three observed facts above.
14 In the FX market, all dealers act as market makers, so all submit bid and ask prices simultaneously to the brokerage
system, which are good for any amount. Then any of the dealers can initiate transactions on the best submitted quotes.
A transaction is called a buying (selling) order, if the initiator of the transaction buys (sells) the commodity currency.
Hence, the number of buys and the number of sells in any FX dataset can move independently of each other. (See Lyons,
2001, for detailed discussion on the microstructure of FX markets.)
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1. It is easy to see that both buys and sells increase due to announcement in our model as individual
orders are given by
di1 − di0 =
µ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶
εi + u1 − u0 =
µ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶
xi −
µ
τ1
δ1
q1 −
τ0
δ0
q0
¶
and we showed that
³
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
´
can be much larger when there is announcement, than when
there is none.
2. Similarly, the volatility of individual orders depend positively on
¯¯¯
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
¯¯¯
as well, since
var
¡
di1 − di0
¢
=
µ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶2 1
α
+
1
δ21
+
1
δ22
.
3. Note, that in the mapping process of demand curves described above, the information content
of individual orders depends on how strongly they are correlated with private information. It is
so because the more heavily a trader uses her information on her speculative betting, the easier
the market maker can deduct the private information of the trader. Since for a given price, q1,
cov
¡
di1 − di0, xi
¢
=
µ
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¶
.
The informativeness of prices again depends only on
³
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
´
.
For the fourth fact, let us just have another look to formula (23) for aggregate speculative volume:
V S1 = V1|u0=u1 =
¯¯¯¯
τ1
δ1
− τ0
δ0
¯¯¯¯
1√
α2π
.
It should be clear that it is unrelated to price changes as speculative volume shows the flow of previously
existing, but less relevant information into the market. Note also that, consistent with the eﬀect of
announcement when there is also a price change, price changes will be connected to aggregate volume
through the risk sharing part of total volume.
Our formula for speculative volume also shows how our model is related to results in Bamber et
al (1997). They show — using the proxy of changes in analysts’ forecasts — that trading volume after
announcements is positively related to three diﬀerent aspects of disagreement: dispersion in prior
beliefs, increase of dispersion after announcements, and the change of positions of investor’s beliefs
relative to each other: belief swap. It is apparent from (23) that speculative volume in our model is
related to all these three aspects of disagreement. The positive dependence on 1α shows the eﬀect of
a priori dispersion of opinion, the term
¯¯¯
τ1
δ1
− τ0δ0
¯¯¯
shows the eﬀect of increasing disagreement and the
fact that for large ω, τ1δ1 turns into negative shows that we will have belief swaps typically in those
cases where there is higher trading volume.
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6 Conclusion
Increased trading volume after public announcements in financial markets are widely perceived as the
sign of increasing disagreement due to the announcement. Hence, the same piece of public information
has very diﬀerent eﬀects on the trading activity of diﬀerent traders. In this paper, we showed — in
contrast to the existing literature — that this stylized fact was an implication of a standard asymmetric
information asset pricing model with common-priors if some traders were trading for resale. These
early traders — instead of the fundamental value of the asset — were interested in the expectation of the
fundamental value of future traders. Hence, even with a simple and plausible information structure,
where higher values of private or public signals imply higher fundamental value, it is possible that
a given public signal implies a higher average opinion of the future trader for one early trader but
lower average opinion of the future trader for an other early trader. Therefore, disagreement increased
across traders. We showed that this was the case when private information sets of traders arriving in
diﬀerent periods were only weakly connected. The intuition was that before the public announcement,
early traders did not have too much information on future traders information, so their expectation on
future traders expectation was very close to the a priori mean. However, public announcement — which
was related to all information sets — connected early trader information to latecomers information,
so informational diﬀerences across early traders became relevant. Consequently, the hectic trading
activity after the announcement was a sign of the existing private information flowing into the market.
We see two promising routes for future research. In the last section, we argued that our findings
are consistent with many stylized facts from the empirical literature. However, it would be intriguing
to confront our model to further tests. Firstly, one could conduct other indirect tests to check whether
the implication of our model is in line with the data. For example, our model implies that the eﬀect
of non-expected announcements to trading volume should be comparable to the eﬀect of expected
announcements. Although informational models are hard to test directly in general, it might be
possible to search for latent informational factors behind trading and relating them to our UK and
US factors.
The second route would be to generalize the theoretical implications of our model to other contexts.
It is quite common in every field of informational economics that — mainly because of technical reasons
— models use aﬃliated informational structures i.e. where higher values in one subset of random
variables makes higher values in another subset more probable. In this paper, we partially relaxed
this assumption. Although higher private and public signals implied higher fundamental value, higher
private signals of some agents implied lower private signals for other agents. We showed that this
departure had very interesting consequences in the financial context. Future research should explore
consequences in other contexts like auction theory or industrial organization.
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Appendix
A.1 Demand in period 0
In period zero traders maximize the expected utility
E
µ
− exp
µ
−a (p1 − p0) di0 −
E (p2|q1, y, xi, q0)− p1
avar (p2|q1, y, xi, q0) (p2 − p1)
¶
|xi, q0
¶
=
= E
µ
E
µ
− exp
µ
−a (p1 − p0) di0 −
E (p2|q1, y, xi, q0)− p1
avar (p2|q1, y, xi, q0) (p2 − p1)
¶
q0, y, xi, q1
¶
|xi, q0
¶
=
= E
Ã
− exp
Ã
−a (p1 − p0) di0 −
(E (p2|q1, y, xi, q0)− p1)2
2var (p2|q1, y, xj , q0)
!
|xi, q0
!
=
= E
µ
− exp
µ
−a (b1q1 + c1y + f1q0 − p0) di0 −
1
2
s (xi − q1)2
¶
|xi, q0
¶
where
s =
b2s³
var (θs + θw|q1, y, xj , q0) + 1τ22
´ = b2aτ1δ1 bs.
If we write the expression in the inner bracket into matrix form and we use the standard result for
the expectation of exponentials with quadratic forms15, we get
E


− exp


−12sx2i − a (f1q0 − p0) di0 +
³
−ac1di0
¡
−ab1di0 + sxi
¢ ´Ã y
q1
!
−
³
y q1
´ ¡
1
2s
¢Ã 0 0
0 1
!Ã
y
q1
!


|xi, q0


=
= − exp


−12sx2i − a (f1q0 − p0) di0 +
³
−ac1di0
¡
−ab1di0 + sxi
¢ ´Ã µy
µq
!
+
1
2
Ã³
−ac1di0
¡
−ab1di0 + sxi
¢ ´
− 2
³
µy µq
´Ã 0 0
0 12s
!!


Ã
0 0
0 s
!
+
Ã
σy σyq
σyq σq
!−1

−1ÃÃ
−ac1di0
−ab1di0 + sxi
!
− 2
Ã
0 0
0 12s
!Ã
µy
µq
!!
−
³
µy µq
´Ã 0 0
0 12s
!Ã
µy
µq
!


15 If c is constant scalar, L is a nx1 constant vector, N is an nxn constant matrix and M is an nx1 stochastic matrix
and I is an information set, then
E
¡
− exp
¡
c+ L0M −M 0NM 0
¢ |I¢ =
− |W |−1/2 ¯¯2N +W−1 ¯¯−1/2 expµc+ L0Q−Q0NQ+ 1
2
¡
L
0 − 2Q0N
¢
)
¡
2N +W−1
¢−1
(L− 2NQ)
¶
where Q = E (M |I) and W = var (M |I) (see Brunnermeier, 2001, page 110).
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where
µq = E (q1|xi, q0)
µy = E (y|xi, q0) .
and Ã
σy σyq
σyq σq
!
= var
ÃÃ
y
q1
!
|xi, q0
!
.
Maximizing the term in the bracket with respect to di0 gives the demand function
di0 =
¡
c1µy + µqb1 + q0f1 − p0
¢
(σqs+ 1)
a
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢ + s ¡xi − µq¢ (c1σyq + b1σq)
a
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢
, which is identical with the one in the text. The second order condition of the maximization is
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢
> 0.
A.2 Expectations, variances and coeﬃcients in the price-functions
We give here the conditional expectations and variances obtained by standard results on normal
variables (see e.g. Brunnermeier, 2001, p12). We also give the equilibrium expressions for coeﬃcients
in the price function. The method to obtain the latter is described in the text.
σy =
2κωβ + κ2β + βαω + βακ+ βτ20ω + βτ
2
0κ+ καω + κ
2α+ κτ20ω + κ
2τ20 + κ
2ω¡
αω + κα+ τ20ω + κτ
2
0 + κω
¢
κβ
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τ21ω + τ
2
1κ+ αω + κα+ τ
2
0ω + κτ
2
0 + κω¡
αω + κα+ τ20ω + κτ
2
0 + κω
¢
τ21
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ω + κ
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2
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by = (ω + κ)
α
αω + ακ+ τ20ω + τ
2
0κ+ κω
c1 = (b2cs + c¯)
b1 =
¡
b2 (bs + es) + f¯
¢
where
b2 =
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B
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and
f¯ = 1B τ
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α+ τ22 + κ
¢
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A.3 Proof of existence
The equilibrium is given by the fixed point of the system
τ2 = f
2 (τ2, τ1, τ0) =
= δ2
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We show the existence in three steps.
Lemma 1 Let us fix τ0 = τ¯0 at any arbitrary level. The system τ2 = f2 (τ2, τ1, τ¯0) , τ1 = f1 (τ2, τ1, τ¯0)
will have at least one fix point, (τ∗1, τ
∗
2). Additionally, τ
min
2 ≤ τ∗2 < δ2 1aα where τmin2 is the single root
of δ2 1aα
κω+κ2
αω+κα+κ2+2κω+κτ22+ωτ
2
2
= τ2 and
(κ2−ωβ)
a2κ < (>)τ
∗
1 ≤ (≥)0 if and only if κ2 < (≥)ωβ.
Furthermore, let τ∗1 (τ0) and τ
∗
2 (τ0) are given as the fixed points corresponding to τ¯0 = τ0 with the
smallest absolute value. Then these functions will be continuous.
Proof. Notice first, that τ1 = f1 (τ2, τ1, τ¯0) determines a third degree polynom in τ1, which is
monotone increasing so it gives a single root for every τ0 and τ2. Similarly,τ2 = f2 (τ2, τ1, τ¯0) also
determines a monotone increasing third degree polynom in τ2 which gives a single unique root for
every τ0 and τ1. It is also apparent that a marginal change in τ0 or τ2 in the first polynom or a
marginal change in τ0 or τ1 in the second polynom will cause only a marginal change in the roots.
This gives the continuity of τ∗1 (τ0) and τ
∗
2 (τ0) .
For the existence, note that from the root of the polynom τ1 = f1 (τ2, τ1, τ¯0), τ21
¡
τ22
¢
is a
well defined continuous function. Therefore, the equilibrium is given by the fixed point of τ2 = 1a
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αδ2g2 (τ2) = f2
¡
τ2, τ21
¡
τ22
¢
, τ¯0
¢
where g (·) continuously maps τ2 to the unite interval. As limτ2→0 1a
αδ2g (τ2) = δ2 1aα
κω+κ2
τ21(0)κ+κ
2+τ21(0)ω+τ
2
0κ+ακ+τ
2
0ω+αω+2κω
> 0, where τ21 (0) is finite and 0 <
1
aαδ2g (τ2) ≤
δ2 1aα, there has to be a fixed point. The rest of the lemma comes from simple observation.
Lemma 2 The second order condition of the maximization problem in period 0 always holds, so the
denominator of f0 (τ1, τ2, τ0)
a
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢
> 0
Proof. Note that the matrix
Q =


Ã
0 0
0 s
!
+
Ã
σy σyq
σyq σq
!−1

−1
is positive definite as s > 0. Consequently
0 < xQxT
for all x. The lemma comes from the choice of
x =
Ã³
−ac1d1 (−ab1d1 + sxi)
´
− 2
³
µy µq
´Ã 0 0
0 12s
!!
as then
0 < xQxT =


a2(c21σy+c21sσyσq−c21sσ2yq+σqb21+2c1σyqb1)
σqs+1
d21−
−2ac1σyqsxi−2σqab1µqs−2ac1σyqµqs+2σqab1sxiσqs+1 d1
+
s2σq(xi−µq)
2
σqs+1

 ,
which is possible for all d1 only if
a
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢
> 0.
Proposition 6 There is always at least one equilibrium.
Proof. From Lemma 1, we have to show that the expression τ0 = g0 (τ0) = f0 (τ∗2 (τ0) , τ
∗
1 (τ0) , τ0)
has at least one fix point. We proceed in 4 steps.
1. Note, that g0 (τ0) = g0 (−τ0) for all τ0. It is so, because τ0 enters as τ20 to all building-blocks of
g0 (τ0) .
2. We show that limτ0→∞ g
0 (τ0) = 0. Let us check the building-blocks separately. As τ0 → 0,
τ∗2 goes to a constant, τ
∗
1 goes to 0 by the order of
1
τ20
, hence c1, σy, s goes to constants, σyq
and by goes to 0 by the order of 1τ20
, σq goes to infinity by the order of τ40 and b1 goes to 0 by
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the order of 1τ20
. So the nominator of g0 (τ0) , (σqs+ 1) (c1 + b1) by + s (1− by) (c1σyq + b1σq) ,
goes to infinity by the order of τ20 from the speed of convergence of the term σqs (c1by + b1) .
The denominator,a
¡
c21σy + 2c1σyqb1 + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21
¢
also goes to infinity but by the
order of τ40 given by the term of c
2
1sσyσq. Hence, limτ0→∞ g
0 (τ0) = 0.
3. The function g0 (τ0) is continuous. It comes by the positivity of the denominator, which holds
because of Lemma 2, and the continuity of all building-blocks.
4. Hence, g0 (τ0) will cross the 45◦ line necessarily, because it is symmetric, continuous and goes
to 0 as τ0 increases without bound. Therefore, there will be a fixed point with τ∗0 ≥ (<) 0 if
g0 (0) ≥ (<) 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. The second half of the statement implies the first half as both the aggregate holdings and
the volume are continuous functions of ω. For the second half of the statement, it is suﬃcient to
show that limω→∞
¯¯¯
τn0
δ0
− τ
n
1
δ1
¯¯¯
= limω→∞
¯¯¯
τn0
δ0
¯¯¯
= limω→∞
¯¯¯
τn1
δ1
¯¯¯
→ 0 while
¯¯¯
τ0
δ0
− τ1δ1
¯¯¯
→ C1,
¯¯¯
τ1
δ1
¯¯¯
→ C2
and
¯¯¯
τ0
δ0
¯¯¯
→ C3 , where C1, C2 and C3 are non zero constants. In the no-announcement case, the
equilibrium is characterized by the following equations:
τn2 = f
2 (τn2 , τ
n
1 , τ
n
0 ) =
=
δ2 1aα
¡
τn20 ω + τ
n2
1 ω + κω + τ
n2
0 κ+ τ
2
1κ+ κ
2
¢
τn20 κ+ τ
n2
0 τ
2
2 + τ
n2
0 ω + ατ
n2
0 + ατ
n2
1 + αω + κα+ κ
2 + 2κω + κτn22 + ωτ
n2
2 + τ
n2
1 τ
n2
2 + τ
n2
1 ω + τ
n2
1 κ
τn1 = f
1 (τn2 , τ
n
1 , τ
n
0 ) =
= δ1τ22α
κ2
a
¡
κτn20 τ
2
2 + κωτ
2
2 + τ
2
2κ
2 + ωτn21 τ
2
2 + 2αωτ
2
2 + κτ
n2
1 τ
2
2 + 2κατ
2
2 + τ
n2
0 ωτ
n2
2 + ακ
2 + κωα
¢
τn0 = f
0 (τn2 , τ
n
1 , τ
n
0 ) = δ0
bny + σ
n
q s
n
bn1aσ
n
q
.
It is apparent, that for any τn1 , τ
n
0 , limω→∞ τ
n
2 is a finite, positive constant, and for any finite, positive
τn2 and any τ
n
0 limω→∞ τ
n
1 = 0. Consequently, limω→0 σ
n
q = limτ1→0 σ
n
q =∞. Hence,
lim
ω→∞
δ0
bny + σ
n
q s
n
bn1aσ
n
q
= lim
ω→∞
sn
bn1
= lim
ω→∞
bnsµ
σns+
1
τ22
¶
bn2
(bns+ens )
bns
+ f¯bs
= 0
, which holds because limω→∞ bns = 0, but limω→∞ b
n
2 , limω→∞ σ
n
s and limω→∞
(bs+es)
bs
= limω→∞
τ21κ
2+ακ2
ακ2 =
1 are non zero constants.
In the announcement case, our equilibrium determining equations go to the following ones as
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ω →∞ :
τ2 = δ2
1
a
α
¡
κ+ τ20 + τ
2
1
¢¡
τ20 + 2κ+ τ
2
2 + τ
2
1 + α
¢
τ1 = −δ1τ22α
β
a
¡
τ21τ
2
2 + κτ
2
2 + τ
2
0τ
2
2 + 2ατ
2
2 + κα
¢
τ0 =
δ0 (σqs+ 1) (c1 + b1) by + s (1− by) (c1σyq + b1σq)
a
¡
c21σy + c
2
1sσyσq − c21sσ2yq + σqb21 + 2c1σyqb1
¢ ,
where the building-blocks of the last equations are all of the corresponding limiting functions. By the
observation of expressions for the building-blocks, it is apparent that all of them are going to finite,
non-zero constants as ω → ∞. Hence, just by the same reasoning as in the existence theorem, there
must be at least one equilibrium where all τ2, τ1, τ0 will be finite and non-zero. If limω→∞ τ1δ1 and
limω→∞
τ0
δ1
happened to be equal with certain combinations of the parameters, small perturbation on
the parameters (for example perturbing δ0) would unambiguously make limω→∞
¯¯¯
τ0
δ0
− τ1δ1
¯¯¯
> 0.
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